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‘Sex’ and Religion after Bostock†
Sachin S. Pandya* and Marcia McCormick**

This paper reviews the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Bostock
v. Clayton County.1 There, the Court held that by barring employer
discrimination against any individual “because of such individual’s . . .
sex,” Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also bars employment
discrimination because an individual is gay or transgender. The paper
then speculates about how much Bostock will a ect how likely lower
court judges will read other “sex” discrimination prohibitions in the U.S.
Code in the same way, in part based on a canvass of the text of about
150 of those prohibitions. The paper also discusses the religion-based
defenses that defendants may raise in response under Title VII itself, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. And the paper suggests how Bostock’s e ect will likely vary
with the in uence of Trump-appointed federal judges.
I. The Opinion
Bostock involved three lawsuits, all of which raised the question of
whether Title VII’s prohibition on employer sex discrimination covers
discrimination against gay or transgender individuals. In Bostock,
Gerald Bostock worked for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare
advocate. When he joined a gay softball league, he was red. In Zarda
v. Altitude Express, Donald Zarda worked for Altitude Express as a
skydiving instructor in New York City. Days after Zarda mentioned to
a female customer that he was gay, he was red. In EEOC v. R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Aimee Stephens, a transgender woman, worked
for R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes in Michigan as a funeral director.
Stephens, assigned the male sex at birth and then-presenting
as a man, was red when she told her boss that, after returning
† © 2020 Sachin S. Pandya and Marcia McCormick. This work is available after publication
under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut (http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7387-1307).
** Professor of Law, Saint Louis University (marcia.mccormick@slu.edu).
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Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
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from vacation, she would be Aimee and would present as a woman.
Bostock and Zarda had sued their former employers, alleging, among
other claims, that they had been red for being gay in violation of Title
VII’s prohibition on employer sex discrimination. In Stephens’s case, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued, alleging
that by ring Stephens, Harris Funeral Homes had violated Title VII’s
prohibition on employer sex discrimination.2
The Supreme Court, in a 6–3 majority opinion by Justice Neil
Gorsuch, ruled that by barring employer discrimination against any
individual “because of such individual’s . . . sex,” section 703(a)(1) of
Title VII also bars employment discrimination because an individual is
gay or transgender.3 Justices Samuel Alito and Brett Kavanaugh opined
in dissent.4
The Court in Bostock described its task as determining “the ordinary
public meaning” of section 703(a)(1) when Congress enacted Title VII
in 1964.5 Both then and now, section 703(a)(1) declares it unlawful for
an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s . . . sex.”6 Bostock started by assuming
arguendo that the term “sex” refers “only to biological distinctions
between male and female.”7 Then, Bostock relied on two other features of
section 703(a)(1)’s text.
First, the phrase “because of” denoted “the ‘simple’ and ‘traditional’
standard of but-for causation.”8 That test, together with the term
“discriminate” (already read to require an intentional di erence
in treatment) implies that “an employer who intentionally treats a

Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018); Zarda v. Altitude
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); E.E.O.C. v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018).
3
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020)
4
Id. at 1754 (Alito, J., with whom Thomas, J., joins, dissenting); id. at 1822 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
5
Id. at 1738.
6
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat.
241, 255.
7
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (so assuming “because nothing in our approach to these cases
turns on the outcome of the parties’ debate [on this issue], and because the employees
concede the point for argument’s sake”).
8
Id.
2
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person worse because of sex—such as by ring the person for actions
or attributes it would tolerate in an individual of another sex—
discriminates against that person in violation of Title VII.”9
Second, Bostock relied on the references to the “individual” in section
703(a)(1)’s text. On its own, Bostock observed, the term “discriminate”
might be read to refer to “the employer’s treatment of groups rather
than individuals, to see how a policy a ects one sex as a whole versus
the other as a whole. . . . So how can we tell which sense, individual or
group, ‘discriminate’ carries in Title VII?” Bostock’s answer: “The statute
. . . tells us three times . . . that our focus should be on individuals,
not groups: Employers may not ‘fail or refuse to hire or . . . discharge
any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.’ § 2000e–2(a)(1)
(emphasis added).”10
From this “ordinary public meaning” of section 703(a)(1)’s text,
Bostock inferred that an employer “violates Title VII when it intentionally
res an individual employee based in part on sex. It doesn’t matter if
other factors besides the plainti ’s sex contributed to the decision. And it
doesn’t matter if the employer treated women as a group the same when
compared to men as a group.”11
In turn, this meant that section 703(a)(1) required employers to
treat “[a]n individual’s homosexuality or transgender status [as] not
relevant to employment decisions. That’s because it is impossible to
discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender
without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”12 To show
this, Bostock ran through many hypotheticals. For example, suppose
an employer has two employees, one male and the other female.
Both are attracted to men and are otherwise identical. If the employer
res the male employee because he is attracted to men, the employer
discriminates against him for traits or conduct it accepts from the female
employee. Similarly, if an employer has two employees who are female,
but res one because she was identi ed as male at birth, but keeps the

Id. at 1740.
Id.
11
Id. at 1741.
12
Id.
9

10
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other who was identi ed as female at birth, the red “employee’s sex
plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the decision.”13 Where
“sex” is a but-for cause, it does not matter that other factors may also
have played a role in the decision.14 Bostock also stressed that because the
ordinary public meaning of section 703(a)(1)’s text was unambiguous,
it did not matter that, because of that text’s breadth, Congress in
1964 may not have foreseen that it would apply to protect gay and
transgender individuals.15
II. The Bostock Effect
How much will Bostock a ect what the lower courts do? Justice Alito,
for one, wrote that he was “virtually certain” that Bostock would have
“far-reaching consequences,” citing the “over 100 federal statutes [that]
prohibit discrimination because of sex.”16 We also believe that Bostock
will make lower courts more likely to read other sex discrimination bans
in the U.S. Code to protect gay and transgender individuals. But unlike
Justice Alito, we have less con dence and more caveats about how much
more likely.
Bostock’s core premise is that if a statute focuses on the individual
and prohibits sex discrimination as section 703(a)(1) of Title VII does,
it necessarily prohibits discrimination against anyone for being gay or
transgender. This premise readily extends to bisexual, heterosexual, and
cisgender individuals, among others, because discriminating against any
such individual on that basis also necessarily makes relevant whether
that individual is taken to be a man or a woman.
Yet, Bostock depends on concluding that, for any particular U.S. Code
ban on sex discrimination, its text, like section 703(a)(1), points to (1) a
focus on the individual, not the group, and (2) a relationship between
the discrimination and “sex” must satisfy no more than the traditional
but-for cause standard. That means that Bostock has escape hatches: Find
instead that the statutory text indicates a focus on the group and not the

Id. at 1741–42.
Id. at 1742. On this point, Bostock argued that its reasoning was consistent with Title
VII precedent. Id. at 1743–44 (discussing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971); Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); and Oncale v.
Sundowner O shore Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75 (1998)).
15
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749–52.
16
Id. at 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting).
13
14
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individual or nd instead that the statutory text indicates something
more stringent than but-for cause.
Alternatively, a judge could nd that the text’s “ordinary public
meaning” is ambiguous on these two issues, and then turn to extra-textual
considerations, such as substantive canons of construction, deference
doctrines, or arguments about statutory purpose, to reach a di erent
conclusion.17 Suppose judges can plausibly disagree (with negligible risk
of professional embarrassment) about whether a sex discrimination ban’s
text is ambiguous on these two issues. A judge may sincerely think the
text is ambiguous in this way. A judge may deliberately call it ambiguous
as a pretext to get Bostock out of the way to rule according to that judge’s
ideological or other preferences. Or a judge, though trying to set aside
those preferences, may unwittingly tend to take that text as ambiguous in
cases where doing so lines up with those preferences. In any case, there is
no accepted objective way to test whether a judge has erred in declaring
the text ambiguous enough,18 apart from at least ve Supreme Court
justices saying so.
Accordingly, we expect Bostock’s e ect to vary in part with how
hard it is for lower court judges to write an opinion concluding that the
statute’s text unambiguously focuses on the individual or the group and
requires no more than but-for cause. Sometimes, the text plausibly cuts
only one way. For example, consider the Title VII sex discrimination
provisions not at issue in Bostock. Much as they denote a focus on the
individual in section 703(a)(1), the terms “any individual” and “such
individual’s” function in the same way in section 703(a)(2),19 as do
similar uses of “any individual” and close variants under section 703’s

Compare Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749 (Title VII’s legislative history, though relevant for
reading “ambiguous statutory language,” has “no bearing” here, because “no ambiguity
exists about how Title VII’s terms apply to the facts before us”) with id. at 1763 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s excuse for ignoring everything other than the bare statutory
text is that the text is unambiguous and therefore no one can reasonably interpret the text
in any way other than the Court does. . . . [T]o say that the Court’s interpretation is the
only possible reading is indefensible.”).
18
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 harv. l. rev. 2118, 2134–2144
(2016); Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity about Ambiguity:
An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. of leGal analysis 257 (2010).
19
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
17
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parallel provisions for employment agencies,20 labor organizations,21
training programs,22 among others.23 What’s more, textualism lets
judges rely on semantic canons of construction, including the one
that says that the same terms within the same Act should be read to
carry the same meaning.24 Thus, because Bostock reads section 703(a)
(1) to focus on the individual, lower courts are likely to read the similar
provisions in the rest of section 703 in the same way. After all, in the few
instances in section 703 when it intended to refer to groups, Congress
used the term “group.”25
III. Applying Bostock outside Title VII
What about Bostock’s e ect on “sex” discrimination provisions
elsewhere in the U.S. Code?26 To roughly sketch that e ect, we started
with Appendix C of Justice Alito’s dissent in Bostock. There, Justice
Alito purported to list the “over 100 federal statutes [that] prohibit
discrimination because of sex” to support his view that “[w]hat the
Court has done today––interpreting discrimination because of ‘sex’
to encompass discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender
identity––is virtually certain to have far-reaching consequences.”27
Unfortunately, because Appendix C does not indicate how Justice
Alito or his sta identi ed the statutory provisions he listed, we could
not reproduce it independently. For convenience, instead of taking our
own census of the U.S. Code’s sex discrimination provisions, we relied
on Appendix C anyway. But we focused on the statutory subsection,
not the statutory section, as the unit of analysis. Thus, where Appendix
C cited a provision that contained a sex discrimination prohibition

See id. § 2000e-2(b).
Id. § 2000e-2(c)(1) (“any individual”); id. § 2000e-2(c)(2)(“any individual”, “such
individual’s”); id. § 2000e-2(c)(3) (“an individual”).
22
E.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995).
23
E.g., id. § 2000e-2(f) (exemption for actions “with respect to an individual who is a
member of the Communist Party of the United States”).
24
E.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995).
25
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (not requiring employer to grant “preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group”); id. § 2000e-2(n)(2)(B) (“members of a group”).
26
E.g., Adams ex. rel. Kasper v. School Board, 968 F.3d 1286, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying
Bostock to Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)).
27
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1778 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting); see id. at
1791–1796 (Appendix C).
20
21
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in more than one of its subsections, we treated each subsection as a
separate observation. Then, we further identi ed (1) the text denoting
the requisite relationship between the discriminatory conduct and sex
(e.g., “because of . . . sex,” “on the basis of . . . sex”); and (2) the text
denoting who it protected from illegal discrimination (e.g., “individual,”
“employee”).
The resulting dataset initially consisted of 187 observations. We
dropped provisions that Justice Alito had cited in Appendix C that used
the term “gender” rather than “sex.” We screened out provisions that, on
their own, were statutory congressional ndings, or statements of policy
or principles, on the premise that, though useful for interpretation, they
alone carry no independent force of law. We also dropped provisions that
simply incorporated by reference another sex discrimination provision in
the U.S. Code, in state law, or more generally referred to other laws that
prohibited sex discrimination. We also excluded Title VII, section 703.
The resulting nal dataset had 151 observations.
Table 1 summarizes how the text in these provisions denote the
relationship between discriminatory conduct and sex.
Table 1
Text Type
on the basis of . . . sex
on the ground of . . . sex
because of . . . sex
based on . . . sex
on account of . . . sex
on the grounds of . . . sex
without regard to . . . sex
on the basis of race, sex, or ethnic groups
based upon . . . sex
because of the borrower’s sex
by reason of . . . sex
of a particular . . . sex
because of the person’s sex
entirely neutral as to the . . . sex . . . of
made or based upon di erence in . . . sex
not solely be based on the . . . sex . . . of
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Frequency
57
19
18
8
8
7
6
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
1

of a speci ed . . . sex
on account of his or her . . . sex
on account of the . . . sex . . . of
on the basis of . . . sex . . . of
on the basis of . . . sex, opposite sex
on the basis of that person’s . . . sex
shall not consider the . . . sex . . . of
take into account . . . the . . . sex . . . of
take sex into account
without distinction as to . . . sex

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

As Table 1 suggests, most of the sex discrimination provisions in the
U.S. Code use language similar to “because of . . . sex” in section 703(a)
(1) of Title VII. In turn, Bostock treats “because of” in section 703(a)(1) to
mean “by reason of” or “on account of,” all equivalent ways in which
Congress can denote the traditional but-for cause standard. Bostock itself
also described its holding in a way that suggests that “because of such
individual’s . . . sex” and “on the basis of . . . sex” are interchangeable.28
Thus, Bostock makes it more likely that lower courts will read the text of
the other sex discrimination statutes in the same way that Bostock read
section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.
Bostock, however, also pointed to how di erent statutory language
might have led the Court to infer di erently. For example, Congress
might have added the word “solely” to “indicate that actions taken
‘because of’ the con uence of multiple factors do not violate the
law” or used the phrase “‘primarily because of’ to indicate that the
prohibited factor had to be the main cause of the defendant’s challenged
employment decision.”29
This part of Bostock makes it easier for judges reading other sex
discrimination statutes with these features to distinguish Bostock away.
For example, when Congress immunized owners of ammonium nitrate
facilities from civil liability for refusing to sell ammonium nitrate to
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753 (“today’s holding—that employers are prohibited from ring
employees on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status”) (emphasis added).
29
Id. at 1739 (citations omitted).
28
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“any person” based on a good-faith “reasonable belief” that the person
wants to use it “to create an explosive device to be employed in an act
of terrorism,” Congress added that the required “reasonable belief . . .
may not solely be based on the . . . sex . . . of that person.”30 Because of the
word “solely” in this provision, a lower court is now more likely to nd
the requisite “reasonable belief” even though the owner in part refused
to sell because the person was gay or transgender.31
Bostock also turned on section 703(a)(1)’s focus on the individual, not
the group. Accordingly, Table 2 summarizes how the text of the other sex
discrimination provisions in the U.S. Code denote the type of actors to be
protected from sex discrimination.
Table 2
Type Protected
Person
Unspeci ed
Membership
Director, O cer
Individual
Students
Borrower
Children
Citizen
Persons
Applicant
Borrower, Applicant
Employee
Employees
Individuals
member, participant
Members
O ce in the Corporation
O cer, Employee

30
31

Frequency
49
20
11
7
7
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

6 U.S.C. § 488f (emphasis added).
For a provision with text cutting the other way, see 28 U.S.C § 994(d) (US Sentencing
Commission “shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral
as to the . . . sex . . . of o enders”) (emphasis added).
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Amateur Athletes, Coaches, Trainers, Managers,
Administrators, and O cials
Applicant Households
Child, Family of the Child
Citizens
Defendant, Victim
Employees, Applicants
Employees, Students
Individual, Position Held by Individual
Individual, O cer, Employee, Agent, Director
Individual, Person
O enders
O cer, Employee, Applicant
People
Person, Persons
Person, Small Business Concern
Person, Class of Persons
Person; Owner, O cer, Director, or
Employee of Such Person
Personnel
Refugees
Residents
Sources of Quali ed Applicants
Sta Position
Visa Refusals

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

As Table 2 suggests, these sex discrimination provisions in the U.S.
Code vary more in the way the text identi es who is protected than that
text denotes the causation standard.
First, some provisions protect an “individual” from sex
discrimination, either as a direct object (discriminating against “any
individual”) or as the subject of the sentence (no “individual” shall
be discriminated against). Bostock stressed section 703(a)(1)’s uses of
the word “individual” as “tell[ing] us . . . that our focus should be on
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individuals, not groups.”32 And Bostock suggested how di erent statutory
text might have led the Court to infer otherwise.33
But not every textual di erence matters. For example, we bet that
lower courts will read Bostock as coming out no di erently even if section
703(a)(1) had used the plural “individuals” instead of the singular
“individual.” The reason: The Dictionary Act provides that, for any “Act
of Congress,” unless “context” indicates otherwise, “words importing
the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things”
and “words importing the plural include the singular.”34 In turn, the
term “context” in the Dictionary Act has been read to mean “the text of
the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of other
related congressional Acts.”35 As a result, when Bostock reasoned that
section 703(a)(1) focused on the individual, not the group, it would not
have taken the plural form “individuals” as indicating a focus on the
group over the individual. Besides, the context—here, the other words in
section 703—cut the other way. In section 703, when Congress wanted to
refer to the group, it used the word “group.”36
Second, most of the sex discrimination provisions in the U.S. Code
protect any “person” from sex discrimination, either as a direct object
(discriminating against “any person”) or as the subject of the sentence
(“No person” shall be discriminated against). In the U.S. Code, the
default reading of “person” requires focusing on the individual and on
some kinds of non-corporeal entities that law treats, in some measure,
as if they act in the world as an individual could. Again, the reason
is the Dictionary Act, which provides that, for any “Act of Congress,
unless context indicates otherwise,” the word “‘person’ . . . include[s]
corporations, companies, associations, rms, partnerships, societies, and
joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”37 Missing from this list:
the term “group,” which Congress has used when de ning “person”

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740.
Id. at 1740‒41.
34
1 U.S.C. § 1.
35
Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993).
36
See supra note 25.
37
1 U.S.C. § 1.
32
33
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elsewhere in the U.S. Code.38 Here, in the context of sex discrimination,
the word “person” squarely focuses on the individual, not the group,
absent more textual cues to the contrary.39
Third, in a few subsections in Title 12 of the U.S. Code, sex
discrimination provisions exist that use the word “groups.” For example,
in disposing of assets as an appointed conservator or receiver, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) must act in a manner that
“prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or ethnic groups in the
solicitation and consideration of o ers.”40
Does this provision focus on the group and not the individual? If
“race,” “sex,” and “ethnic” are adjectives that all modify “groups,” then
perhaps the statute focuses on groups alone. If so read, a lawyer could
wield Bostock to make it less likely that this sex discrimination provision
covers gay or transgender individuals, because it covers sex groups, and
thus can be read to let the FDIC treat actual and prospective o erers
comparably as groups of men and women. As writers of the English
language, we are skeptical of this reading. It implies that “race” here is
an adjective, while ordinary English usage prefers “racial” (adjective)
to “race” (noun) when describing a group (“racial group” over “race
group”). Besides, we can’t nd the phrase “sex groups” in the current
U.S. Code or, for that matter, in any volume of the Statutes at Large.41 On
the other hand, if only “ethnic” modi es “groups” (“ethnic groups,” a
phrase Congress has used elsewhere42), then the subsection’s text alone
E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2702(b); 12 U.S.C. § 3752(7); 15 U.S.C. § 8702(15); 22 U.S.C. § 2797c(a)(8)
(A); 22 U.S.C. § 8531(4)(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2014(s); 52 U.S.C. § 30101(11).
39
While whomever can disfavor someone because of the sex assigned to that human
being, in ordinary English-language writing, no one typically assigns companies and
corporations a sex. Apple, Inc. and ExxonMobil are neither male nor female. Still,
Congress sometimes writes sex discrimination provisions also to protect a non-corporeal
entity, as well as human beings related to a non-corporeal entity, in some way. E.g., 50
U.S.C. § 4842(a)(1)(B) (requiring regulations prohibiting any “United States person” who,
intending to support a foreign country’s boycott against any country “friendly” to the
U.S., discriminates “against any United States person on the basis of . . . sex . . . of that
person or of any owner, o cer, director, or employee of such person”); 15 U.S.C. § 633(b)
(1) (Small Business Administration “shall not discriminate on the basis of sex . . . against
any person or small business concern applying for or receiving assistance from the Small
Business Administration”).
40
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(E)(iv).
41
We searched the Westlaw database of the current U.S. Code Annotated (“TE(‘sex
groups’)”) and the Hein Online database of all the volumes of the U.S. Statutes at Large
(“sex groups”). Both searches yielded zero results.
42
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 247b-4(c)(2) (“racial and ethnic groups”).
38
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leaves it unclear whether to focus on the individual only, the group only,
or both depending on case context or statutory purpose.
Fourth, what about provisions that identify the direct object of
the illegal sex discrimination by a more particular category, such as
“employee,” “applicant,” “member” or seeker of “membership,”
“students,” or “citizen”? Again, context matters a lot. For example, in
Title 36 of the U.S. Code, Congress created some national organizations
for military veterans and, in so doing, often provided that the
requirements for “membership” in, or to serve as “director” or “o cer”
of, such an organization “may not discriminate on the basis of . . . sex.”43
Writers of English would typically use those words to refer to how an
organization treats someone who wanted to join it, or to serve as one of
its directors or o cers—a focus on the individual. Accordingly, a lawyer
wielding Bostock can credibly argue that a court must read “the basis
of . . . sex” to cover otherwise eligible gay and transgender individuals
who want to join, say, the Air Force Sergeants Association. If other
textual cues indicate that this sex discrimination provision focuses on
the group, however, then a judge is more likely to distinguish Bostock
and read the statute to let the Association disfavor any particular
individual who wants to join for being gay or transgender, so long as
that Association treats men and woman comparably as groups when
deciding who gets in.44
Finally, what about a provision that does not identify who it protects
against sex discrimination (labeled in Table 2 as “unspeci ed”)? Bostock’s
e ect on these provisions is simply uncertain. We expect that lawyers
who want to wield Bostock will search for words surrounding the
provisions—be they in the same section, related sections, or in provisions
of di erent yet related Acts of Congress—to present as a basis for
inferring a focus on the individual, not the group alone. In turn, Bostock’s
e ect depends not only on those surrounding words, but also how likely
a court is inclined to declare the statutory text ambiguous nonetheless,

43
44

E.g., 36 U.S.C. §§ 20204(b), 20205(c) (Air Force Sergeants Association).
Cf. 36 U.S.C. § 220522(a)(9) (an amateur sports organization is eligible to be recognized
as the national governing body only if governing board “members are selected without
regard to . . . sex, except that, in sports where there are separate male and female
programs, it provides for reasonable representation of both males and females on the
board of directors or other governing board”).
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and if so, all the other statutory interpretation arguments to which a
court may then resort, either on its own or at a lawyer’s urging. Still, if a
court concludes, for whatever reason, that the provision focuses on the
individual, then, thanks to Bostock, a court is more likely to read that sex
discrimination provision to also cover gay and transgender individuals.
IV. Religion Defenses after Bostock
After Bostock, some employers are more likely to raise religionbased defenses to Title VII liability for discriminating against gay or
transgender individuals. In dicta, Bostock pointed to three legal sources
for such defenses: Title VII itself, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
and the First Amendment.45 Let’s consider each in turn.
A. Title VII: Religion Organization Exemptions
Title VII a ords several exemptions from liability, two of which cover
employers who are religious organizations. Under section 702(a), Title
VII does not apply to any “religious corporation, association, educational
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with” that organization’s
activities.46 And under section 703(e), Title VII does not declare it
illegal for an educational institution “to hire and employ employees of
a particular religion” if it is at least substantially “owned, supported,
controlled, or managed by a particular religion” or a particular religious
organization, or if the educational institution’s “curriculum . . . is
directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.”47 In other
words, religious organizations, and the schools close enough to them,
need not fear Title VII liability for discriminating against an individual
because that individual is of a di erent religion.48
After Bostock, if a gay or transgender individual brings an otherwise
winning Title VII sex discrimination claim, how likely is an employer
to escape Title VII liability with one of these exemptions? In his Bostock

Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
47
Id. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
48
Section 703(e) of Title VII also exempts any employer, religious organization or not, that
discriminates “on the basis of . . . religion . . . in those certain instances where religion . . .
is a bona de occupational quali cation reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise.” Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
45
46
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dissent, Justice Alito worried that these exemptions, as read by the lower
courts, “provide only narrow protection.”49
A lot initially depends on whether the defendant-employer quali es
as “a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society” or as a school closely a liated with one. To decide this, lower
courts have pointed to, among other factors, whether the employer
is a non-pro t or for-pro t entity.50 If an employer does qualify as a
religious organization, then the exemptions are expansive, because Title
VII de nes “religion” to include “all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief,”51 and because section 702(a) applies
even if the employee performed only secular activities.52 For example,
courts have held that Title VII exempts a religious organization that res
an employee for becoming pregnant after extramarital sex, provided
that organization prove that it red her because extramarital sex is
inconsistent with its “particular religion.”53 Thus, religious employers are
likely to invoke these exemptions to defeat Title VII sex discrimination
liability, arguing that the employer’s “particular religion” requires
conforming gender expression to the sex assigned at birth or limiting
sexual intimacy to the opposite sex, and thus discriminating against a
gay and transgender individual because of religion.
B. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) may provide another
defense in some cases. Under RFRA, the federal government “shall
not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless the
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1781 (footnote omitted).
E.g., Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011); LeBoon v. Lancaster
Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007); see also EEOC Compliance
Manual § 12-II(C)(1)(2020).
51
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
52
Compare Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (“of its
religious activities”) with Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92–261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103, 103–04 (amending section 702: “of its activities”).
53
See generally Darian B. Taylor, Validity, Construction, and Application of Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e)(2)) Exempting Activities of Religious Organizations
from Operation of Title VII Equal Employment Opportunity Provisions, 6 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6,
§§ 19–20 (2015 & Supp. 2020) (compiling cases).
49
50
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government shows that applying “the burden to the person” furthers a
“compelling governmental interest” and is the “least restrictive means”
to further that interest.54 The term “person” in RFRA includes a closelyheld for-pro t corporation.55
In Bostock, the Court noted in dicta that because RFRA “displac[es]
the normal operation of other federal laws, it might supersede Title
VII’s commands in appropriate cases.”56 After Bostock, suppose a
gay or transgender individual brings an otherwise winning Title VII
sex discrimination claim. In response, the defendant-employer, a
corporation, raises a RFRA defense, arguing that Title VII “substantially
burden[s]” its exercise of “religion” by imposing civil liability for acting
consistent with a religious motivation not to employ anyone who is gay
or transgender. How likely is that RFRA defense to prevail?
In federal court, such a RFRA defense is unavailable where the
federal appellate court has concluded that RFRA does not apply unless
the government is a party to the litigation.57 RFRA, by its terms, only
applies where “[g]overnment” substantially burdens religious exercise.58
RFRA makes the “government” bear the burdens of “going forward
with the evidence and of persuasion” in showing that the challenged
burden on religious exercise is the least restrictive means of furthering
a compelling governmental interest,59 which the government cannot do
if it is not a party to the lawsuit.60 Moreover, Congress enacted RFRA to
restore a Free Exercise Clause doctrine that had only applied to burdens

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b).
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682, 719 (2014).
56
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3). The Bostock
and Zarda defendants had not raised RFRA, and the defendant in Harris Funeral Homes
had not sought review of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling on its RFRA defense. See id.
57
Listecki v. O cial Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2015);
General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402, 410 (6th Cir.
2010). But see Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (RFRA defense available
in ADEA lawsuit brought by private plainti , because ADEA was also “enforceable” by
EEOC); id. at 114–15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); and Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198,
204 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008) (dicta disfavoring RFRA analysis in Hankins).
58
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
59
Id. §§ 2000bb-1(b), 2000bb-2(3).
60
Hankins, 441 F.3d at 114–15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
54
55

60

‘Sex’ and Religion after Bostock
on religious exercise imposed by the government.61
What then did Bostock mean by noting in dicta that RFRA “might
supersede Title VII’s commands in appropriate cases” (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-3)? Perhaps Bostock was referring to Harris Funeral Homes, where
the defendant had litigated a RFRA defense that it could raise because a
federal government agency (the EEOC) had initiated the Title VII lawsuit
against it.62 If so, the citation to 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 simply reminds the
reader that RFRA “applies to all Federal law, and the implementation
of that law, whether statutory or otherwise,”63 including federal
government enforcement of Title VII by the EEOC.64
Alternatively, perhaps Justice Gorsuch cited to 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3
to encourage lawyers to argue in future cases that, because RFRA applies
to the “implementation” of “all Federal law,” a RFRA defense is available
even in a Title VII lawsuit with only private parties.65 This reading,
however, raises many puzzles, including whether such a RFRA defense
exists if that Title VII lawsuit is in state court66 and why RFRA de nes

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (RFRA’s purposes: “(1) to restore the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972), and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government”) (emphasis added).
62
E.E.O.C. v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 584 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f
Stephens had initiated a private lawsuit against the Funeral Home to vindicate her rights
under Title VII, the Funeral Home would be unable to invoke RFRA as a defense because
the government would not have been party to the suit.”).
63
42 USC § 2000bb-3(a); see Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2383 (2020) (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) covers “regulations
implementing the [A ordable Care Act] contraceptive mandate”).
64
Hankins, 441 F.3d at 115 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Read in conjunction with the rest of
the statute, [42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3] simply requires courts to apply RFRA ‘to all Federal
law’ in any lawsuit to which the government is a party.”).
65
Shruti Chaganti, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Provides a Defense in Suits by
Private Plainti s, 99 va. l. rev. 343, 357 (2013) (reasoning that government action includes
the imposition of legal rules “to be enforced by private plainti s,” citing, for example,
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); that RFRA applies to the “implementation”
of federal law; and therefore that “private plainti s suing over defendants’ exercises of
religion are enforcing, or ‘implement[ing],’ a government-imposed burden on religion”)
(footnote omitted).
66
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (declaring RFRA unconstitutional as
applied to States); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106–274, § 7(a)(1), (b) 114 Stat. 803, 806 (amending RFRA by striking “a State, or
a subdivision of a State” in de nition of “government” and striking “and State” in 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a)).
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“government” to include a “person” only if that person is “acting under
color of law.”67
Assuming a Title VII defendant can raise a RFRA defense, it must
show that Title VII or its implementation “substantially burdens” the
defendant’s conduct; that conduct is an “exercise of religion”; and the
religious motivation for that conduct is sincerely held. How a RFRA
defense to Title VII would fare on the merits is unclear. Past RFRA
litigation tells us little. From July 2014 up through 2018, the federal
district courts decided 115 RFRA claims on the merits, but only seven of
those were employment cases (about six percent, with plainti s winning
in four and losing in three).68 Still, RFRA’s de nition of “religion” is
broad, providing that religious “exercise” need not be “compelled by,
or central to, a system of religious belief.”69 Accordingly, we expect the
lower courts to accept most assertions that the conduct at issue is an
exercise of “religion.” In contrast, taking the case law as a guide, we
expect more disputes among litigants over RFRA’s “substantial burden”
and whether imposing it is the “least restrictive means” to advance a
“compelling” government interest.
To illustrate, consider the fate of the RFRA defense in Harris Funeral
Homes.70 The defendant funeral home was a for-pro t corporation that
Thomas Rost owned and operated. In the Sixth Circuit, the funeral home
argued that Title VII, as applied to prohibit it from ring Ms. Stephens,
was a “substantial burden” on Rost’s religious exercise of running the
funeral home to serve grieving people.71 The Sixth Circuit considered
and rejected two alleged substantial burdens.
First, Rost did not su er a “substantial burden” on the ground
that letting Stephens wear a skirt-suit to work would distract grieving
families and thereby obstruct Rost’s ability to serve them. This assumed
that customers would perceive Stephens as a man in woman’s attire and
be disturbed by a transgender funeral director. It was, however, at least
a “material question of fact as to whether [Rost’s] clients would actually
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1),(2) (“any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and
o cial (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States” or the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the federal territories and possessions).
68
Meredith Abrams, Empirical Analysis of Religious Freedom Restoration Act Cases in the
Federal District Courts Since Hobby Lobby, 4 coluM. huM. rts. l. rev. online 55, 71–72 tbl.
1–2 (2019).
69
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4).
70
E.E.O.C. v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 585–597 (6th Cir. 2018).
71
Id. at 585. No party disputed that Rost’s religious motivation was sincere. Id.
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be distracted.”72 More importantly, as a matter of law, “a religious
claimant cannot rely on customers’ presumed biases” to establish a RFRA
substantial burden.73
Second, Rost did not su er a “substantial burden” on the ground
that Rost had to either provide female attire to Stephens or let her wear
female attire to work—which he believed to be religiously forbidden—
or go out of business. Although Rost “currently provides his male
employees with suits and his female employees with stipends to pay
for clothing,” no law or religious motivation required Rost to provide
that bene t, and the record did not show that bene t was “necessary
to attract workers.”74 Moreover, the court accepted as sincere Rost’s
belief that he would “’violate God’s commands’” by letting Stephens
“represent herself as a woman,” “because it would make him ‘directly
involved in supporting the idea that sex is a changeable social construct
rather than an immutable God-given gift.’” Nonetheless, the court found
no RFRA “substantial burden” as a result, because as a matter of law,
“bare compliance with Title VII—without actually assisting or facilitating
Stephens’s transition e orts—does not amount to an endorsement of
Stephens’s views.”75
Finally, the Sixth Circuit held that, in any case, the EEOC showed
that any such “substantial burden” furthers a “compelling governmental
interest” and is the “least restrictive means” to further that interest. If
the EEOC could not enforce Title VII against the funeral home for ring
Stephens, it could not advance its compelling interest of combating
workplace discrimination.76 And Title VII liability was the least restrictive
means to enforce that compelling interest here. For example, neither a
gender-neutral dress code, nor an “equally-burdensome” sex-speci c
dress code, su ced as lesser restrictive alternatives, because Rost’s

Id.
Id. at 586–87. Cf. 29 CFR § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii), (2) (EEOC guideline that, unless necessary
for “authenticity or genuineness . . . e.g., an actor or actress,” Title VII’s “bona de
occupational quali cation” exception for “sex” discrimination does not apply to “refusal
to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or
customers”).
74
Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 587–88.
75
Id. at 590 (citation omitted).
76
Id. at 591–93.
72
73

63

sex-stereotyping applied not just to what Stephens wanted to wear, but
Stephens’s appearance and behavior more generally.77
C. The First Amendment and the Ministerial Exception
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment bar applying
employment discrimination statutes “to claims concerning the
employment relationship between a religious institution and its
ministers.”78 After Bostock, suppose a gay or transgender individual
brings an otherwise winning Title VII sex discrimination claim, and the
defendant-employer raises this “ministerial exception” defense to defeat
Title VII liability. How likely is that defense to prevail?
In short, because the Court has adopted a case-by-case approach
to the issue of who counts as a “minister,” a lot depends on how easily
lawyers and judges can analogize to the case characteristics of prior
rulings on the ministerial exception defense. Relevant factors include
whether the entity and the potential minister considered the person
a minister, whether that person had a distinct role within that entity
related to its religious mission, how much religious training the role
required, and whether the person’s job duties included conveying
the entity’s religious message or carrying out its religious mission.
The title “minister” and its equivalents, and the associated formal
religious training, are not dispositive. For example, in Our Lady of
Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that
the ministerial exception applied to “employment disputes involving
teachers at religious schools who are entrusted with the responsibility of
instructing their students in the faith,” thus apparently increasing that
defense’s scope.79
V. The Trump Judges
Bostock’s e ect depends not only how lower court judges read
Bostock and the text of sex discrimination statutes, but also on those
judges’ ideological and personal preferences about gender, sexuality,

Id. at 593–94.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U. S. 171, 188
(2012).
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and religion. As best as can be measured, judge ideology matters to case
outcomes, though it is often hard to disentangle how much it matters
relative to other motivations or in uences.80
In recent years, federal judges have been more openly appointed
based on their apparent ideological preferences, on the premise that
those preferences will substantially a ect how those judges will rule. As
of September 2020, President Trump had appointed over 200 judges to
serve on the main Article III federal courts (the U.S. Supreme Court, the
thirteen U.S. Courts of Appeal, and the federal district courts), or about
a quarter of the active federal judges on those courts.81 Most Trump
appointees to the federal appellate courts had ties to the Federalist
Society and were chosen as part of a process that weighted heavily their
conservative bona des.82
If those lower court judges’ ideological preferences include
disapproval of individuals who depart from heterosexual or cisgender
norms, how much will that a ect what those judges do with Bostock?83
To illustrate, consider Stuart Kyle Duncan, appointed in 2018 by
President Trump to the federal court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
In United States v. Varner,84 a pre-Bostock case, Judge Duncan, writing
a majority opinion (for himself and Judge Jerry E. Smith, a Reagan
appointee), ruled that a district court could not consider a transgender
woman prisoner’s request to change the name on that prisoner’s
judgment of con nement from “Norman Varner” to “Kathrine Nicole
Jett.” In the appeal, the prisoner-appellant, proceeding pro se, had led
a two-sentence motion (titled “Motion to Use Female Pronouns When
Addressing Appellant”): “I am a woman and not referring to me as
See Allison P. Harris & Maya Sen, Bias and Judging, 22 ann. rev. of Pol. sci. 241 (2019);
Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ann. rev. of Pol. sci. 11
(2013).
81
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(Mar. 14, 2020).
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E.g., Letter of Am. Bar Ass’n to U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. re: Nomination of Lawrence
J.C. VanDyke to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Oct. 29, 2019) (“Some
interviewees raised concerns about whether Mr. VanDyke would be fair to persons who
are gay, lesbian, or otherwise part of the LGBTQ community. Mr. VanDyke would not
say a rmatively that he would be fair to any litigant before him, notably members of the
LGBTQ community.”) The Senate con rmed VanDyke’s appointment to the Ninth Circuit
on December 11, 2019.
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such leads me to feel that I am being discriminated against based on
my gender identity. I am a woman—can I not be referred to as one?”85
Denying her request, Judge Duncan wrote that the law did not require
anyone to refer to “gender-dysphoric litigants with pronouns matching
their subjective gender identity”; if a court were to so require, it “may
unintentionally convey its tacit approval of the litigant’s underlying
legal position”; and it would be “quixotic” for federal judges to order
use of “a litigant’s preferred pronouns,” given the complexity of “such
neologisms” in other possible cases.86
Suppose we infer from Varner’s content and tone that Judge Duncan
tends to prefer cisgender over transgender individuals, all else equal,
for whatever reason. If so, we might expect that, as a result, Judge
Duncan, either deliberately or unwittingly, is more likely to distinguish
Bostock away in cases where transgender individuals bring claims of
sex discrimination under federal law or more likely to accept religionbased defenses to those cases, all else equal. And the more other Trump
appointees share this tendency, the more likely that they too will rule,
vote, and write opinions accordingly.
Yet, this e ect on Bostock will also likely vary with how Trump
appointees comprise particular federal appellate courts. For example,
President Trump has appointed six of the twelve active judges on
Eleventh Circuit, six of the seventeen active judges on the Fifth Circuit,
three of the fteen active judges on the Fourth Circuit, but none of the
active judges on the First Circuit.87 In any particular appeal, the odds of a
Trump-appointee majority on a three-judge panel vary accordingly, and
with that, what that panel will do with Bostock.

Id. at 259 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 254–58 (footnote omitted). In dissent, Judge James L. Dennis, a Clinton appointee,
stated that he would have granted the request, noting, as the majority opinion had, that
“though no law compels granting or denying such a request, many courts and judges
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***
In this essay, we speculated about Bostock’s effect by pointing to the
text of other sex-discrimination bans in the U.S. Code, the contours of
possible religion-based defenses, and Trump appointees to the federal
judiciary. Despite Justice Ginsburg’s recent death, five of the six justices
in the Bostock majority remain on the Court. As a result, Bostock will
likely persist as precedent, even if Justice Ginsburg’s successor prefers
Justice Alito’s Bostock dissent (or disfavors Bostock on other grounds) and
does not feel bound to Bostock by stare decisis. Nor do we suspect that
such a successor, if appointed, would affect how hard lawyers work to
distinguish Bostock away based on textual differences or work to make it
easier for religion-based defenses to prevail. With Justice Ginsburg still
alive, those lawyers would likely have made such arguments anyway.
But, if her successor would readily accept such arguments, those
lawyers are more likely to succeed, if only because they would have to
convince Justice Gorsuch or Justice Roberts, not both, when the issue
ultimately comes before the Court.
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